Briefing Note :Food Safety In Canada After XL FOOD INC and E.COLI crisis




MEMORANDUM TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE STEPHEN HARPER, PRIME MINISTER


FOOD SAFETY IN CANADA AFTER XL FOOD INC AND E.COLI CRISIS
(FOR DECISION)
SUMMARY
E.coli outbreak from XL Foods’ tainted beef trimmings has led to yet anouther review of our food safety system. In light of the Weatherhill report and the implementation of its recommendations, it is our view that the problem lies with the offending companies rather than the government agencies.
We looked at two main factors when deciding on our recommendation. Firstly, most of the recommendations made in the Weatherhill report have been implemented. The following issues have been addressed: inadequate legislative and regulatory framework, shortcomings in federal organizational governance/structure, and inadequate communication with the public. It will take time to see the full effects of the implementation on the food safety system. Secondly, XL Foods’ conduct and their lack of cooperation had a negative impact on CFIA’s initial investigation and on the citizens’ view of the food production companies’ dedication to keeping the consumers’ health a priority in foodborne illness crisis.
Thus it is our view that in order to be better prepared for future outbreaks of foodborne illness, we need to augment the authority of Health Canada and PHAC in ways that will allow them better deal with uncooperative companies.


Background & Current Status: On September 4th, the CFIA identified E. coli in Alberta facility supplied by XL Foods Inc. It did not recall the product, because it deemed that no contaminated product reached the Canadian marketplace. However, some of the contaminated product has reached the US border.  The CFIA’s inspectors began supervising ongoing operation of the company. On September 5th, the CFIA began its investigation into the source of contamination, but it did not identify the potentially effected production dates until September 11th when XL Foods’ management provided the necessary information for the investigation. This information was not forthcoming from the company.  On Sept.12th, the agency sent in technical experts, who later found several problems that could have led to contamination issues. The first public recall alert (on beef trimmings of Aug.24, 28 and Sept.5) was issued on September 16th, which continued almost daily.  Next day, it activated national emergency operations centre in order to coordinate the response activities. On Sept. 18th, Health Hazard Alert was issued, and Corrective Action Request (CAR) was sent to XL Foods. On September 21st,   based on its continued investigation, the CFIA added two additional production dates August 27th and 29th.  On September 27th, the CFIA suspended XL Food Inc.’s license to operate. On October 3rd and 4th, Minister Ritz held press conferences to reassert that the plant will not re-open until it is deemed safe. The head of XL Foods made his first public statement taking full responsibility on Oct.4th. On October 11th, the CFIA allowed the plant to process carcasses under continued strict conditions. On October 14th, XL Foods temporarily laid off 2000 workers until it resumed full operations. The plant was allowed to reopen on October 23rd.  To date, sixteen people were reported sick from contaminated beef.
However, the CFIA released a statement on November 3rd that although the XL Foods’ overall food safety control are effectively managed, it has found some issues. CARs were issued to XL Foods to address these issues. These shortcomings were expected by the CFIA due to absence of regular operation of the plant for some time.
Considerations & Analysis :  In contrast to the 2008 listeriosis outbreak where 23 people have died, the final result of all the actions taken by the government to protect the public was 18 sick people from XL Foods’ contaminated beef trimmings.

It should be noted that Canada’s food safety system has recently improved due to the Weatherhill report. The report has concluded that there were several problems when it comes to food safety in Canada: inadequate legislative and regulatory framework, shortcomings in federal organizational governance/structure and inadequate communication with the public. These problems were addressed prior to XL Foods’ E. coli outbreak as outlined in Action on Weatherhill Report Recommendations to Strengthen the Food Safety System: Final Report to Canadians:

 

Legislative and regulatory framework criticism: The report pointed out that legislation governing food safety and quality was “out of date and in need of substantial consolidation and modernization”. To address this, the Bill S-11 - the “Safe Food for Canadians Act” – was introduced and is currently before the Senate. The bill repeals three food acts and consolidates them into a single law. The Weatherhill Report also recommends that the CFIA conducts a resources audit to accurately determine the demand on its inspection resources. This will be met by the current amendment proposed to Bill S-11, which calls for an assessment of the funding allocated to food safety once every five years.

Organizational criticism: The report remarked on several of CFIA’s problems in areas of governance, structure, and accountability which hindered its optimal performance. It came to the same conclusion about PHAC. In April 2011, the CFIA introduced streamlined business processes by adopting business strategies to facilitate the routine updating of its regulations, directives and food safety programs.


Communications: The report noted several shortcomings in communication with the public: late, fragmented and reactive. Since then, the combined work of PHAC, Health Canada and the CFIA produced and finalized the Food Safety Communications Protocol in January 2010 which clarifies the roles and responsibilities within the federal family for joint communications on food safety issues that involve the three federal partners. It is based on risk communications principles that are consistent with the Health Canada/PHAC Health Portfolio Risk Communications Framework.
Other Considerations: It should be noted that the first public recall was issued on September 16th, which is 12 days after an issue was detected and 3 days after the CFIA removed XL Foods Inc. from the list of eligible companies to export to the US. This shows that the CFIA was hesitant at warning the Canadian public at the first sign of a problem, while choosing to err on the side of caution when it came to exporting to US.
In the in-depth investigation, the CFIA concluded that outbreak was caused not by a single factor, but several contributing factors which by themselves would not have caused an immediate concern during the course of normal inspection activities. These deficiencies were identified by the CFIA in the areas of E. coli control measures and sampling and testing procedures.
The E.coli outbreak was not handled to the best ability due to the actions taken specifically by XL Foods after they knew they were the cause of the problem. Unlike Maple Leaf Foods, XL Foods did not readily cooperate with the government. It was not proactive, nor was it forthcoming with the information to the public. The final result was that the CFIA, forced by uncooperativeness of XL Foods, had to act reactively during the crisis. The CFIA issued first CARs on September 7th, the response to which it deemed inadequate on September 27th when it closed the plant. It took 20 days for CARs to be implemented by XL Foods, and it was still done inadequately. In addition, XL Foods Inc. was not forthcoming with the information when asked verbally by the CFIA on September 6th.  It only started to provide that information on September 10th. This has delayed CFIA’s investigation in locating the infected product dates. The CFIA was too passive in its relations with XL Foods which allowed to the company to stall and could have contributed to the number of sick people. In addition, unlike in Maple Leaf Foods case, the head of XL Foods did not issue a prompt apology; it was made 23 days after first public recall alert.
Options: Since the Weatherhill Report the government has been very active in its efforts to improve food safety in Canada by implementing most of the report’s recommendations as outlined in Action on Weatherhill Report Recommendations to Strengthen the Food Safety System: Final Report to Canadians. However, it is apparent that the actions taken to protect the public will not be fully effective without the full cooperation of the company at fault. Therefore, we suggest two possible ways of augmenting the authority of Health Canada and PHAC that will allow them better deal with uncooperative companies:
1. Health Canada could establish a policy that imposes a time limit on providing distribution and testing information.
2. In order to ease its communications with the companies at fault, PHAC could impose a specific crisis management & cooperation protocol for the companies to follow.
Option 1: The lack of immediate cooperation on the part of XL Food Inc. has delayed CFIA’s investigation. Therefore, Health Canada could establish a policy that imposes a time limit on how long a company has in order to provide distribution and testing information. This option would give the government more power vis-à-vis the private companies, while requiring only minimal administrative actions. The enforcement options could be the CFIA’s current enforcement powers: shutting down production lines, suspending the plant’s operating licence or prosecuting. However, we suggest that a hefty fine (~ $ 100, 000 per late day) would be more appropriate and efficient way of inciting prompt cooperation. Consequently, the CFIA’s powers will have to be expanded for this option.  This option is likely to generate a lot of public support, because it will show government’s strong stance on protecting public health via its proactive way of addressing any obstacles to the earliest detection foodborne illness and prevention of an outbreak.
Option 2: The failure of XL Food Inc. to follow the example of Maple Leaf Foods in 2008 in cooperation with the government has also contributed to the CFIA’s difficulty in interaction with the company. Thus we suggest PHAC could research, create and impose a specific crisis management & cooperation protocol for the companies to follow. It should outline the successful crisis management actions (use of prominent spokesperson, prompt public apology, proactive containment action, appropriate/consistent message and open communication) and the CFIA’s cooperation expectations from the company. This option could technically embody Option 1 within it, thus it would be a much more involved initiative for the government. However, this option would improve the overall image of Canadian food safety system, because it would force the offending companies to react in a way that paints them in a favourable light as accountable, proactive, open, sympathetic and apologetic.
Recommendation: We recommend Option 1, because there were many recent changes to Canadian food system (as a result of the Weatherhill report) the full effect of which could still be noticed later on. These effects could render Option 2 obsolete. However, if there is consistent lack of cooperation from offending companies, Option 2 should be explored. 

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